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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the influence of financial considerations on
the oil production policies of oil producing countries. Financial
considerations are only one set in an array of factors affecting the
decisions of these countries. Other factors include technology,
politics, and conservation.1 This study, therefore, should be viewed
as only a partial analysis of oil supply determination. However, it has
become increasingly clear that the decisions of the oil producing
countries may be more heavily influenced by short-run financial
considerations, such as their need for foreign exchange, their assessment
*This paper is part of a more general research project currently
under way at the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory. I would like to thank
Professors M.A. Adelman and H.D. Jacoby and Dr. J.L. Paddock for helpful
comments and suggestions; . McDonald and S. Aliana for research
assistance, and P. Heron for editorial assistance. Financial support
from the M.I.T. Center for Energy Policy Research is gratefully
acknowledged.
1For an interesting discussion of how political considerations mayinfluence oil production decisions of these countries, see Noreng (1978)
and Weisberg (1977) and for other studies on financial cnsiderations see
Ben-Shahar 1976) and Moran (1978).
3of the availability and cost of foreign financing, and their apprehension
of the impact of changes in oil revenues on their domestic economies,
than by any long-run consideration.
One important factor bearing upon this issue is the predominance of
the oil sector in their national economies. Exhibits A.1 and A.2 in the
appendix indicate the degree to which the economy of these countries
depends on oil revenues. These exhibits show the ratio of oil exports to
total exports and the ratio of oil revenues to total government revenues
for a selected number of oil producing countries for different years.
These exhibits demonstrate that oil exports accounted for more than 90
percent of total exports in Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi
Arabia in 1977. However, the contribution of oil exports to total
exports is less significant in Indonesia and Mexico (about 67 percent in
Indonesia and about 22 percent in Mexico in 1977). Similarly, oil
revenues constituted the major source of government revenues in these
countries. On the average, oil revenues provided about 78 percent of
total government revenues in 1977. Changes in oil revenues have an
immediate impact on the balance of payments, government budget, money and
credit supply, prospects of economic growth, and thus on social and
economic stability. Hence, these countries are increasingly conscious of
the problems inherent in using their oil resources, and the allocation of
their oil earnings among various uses.
In keeping with our emphasis on the short-run behavior of oil
exporters, this analysis is based on a "warehouse model" approximation of
the oil supply process of these countries. That is, the oil supply
process is treated as if oil were stored in a warehouse. The detailed
4processes of oil exploration, development, production, and refining (of
products) are neglected in the analysis,2 and it is assumed that an oil
exporting country can produce and export its desired amount with no
binding technological and productive capacity constraints. This is a
simplifying assumption that will be amended in future research. However,
it might be possible to justify this assumption for the group of oil
exporters whose existing productive capacity greatly exceeds their
production,3 and thus increasing their production up to the capacity
limit may not take much time, nor require much substantial investment in
oil exploration and development.
In analyzing how financial considerations influence the behavior of
oil exporting countries, it is useful to distinguish between two groups:
the financial surplus and the financial deficit countries. Judging from
their current account on the balance of payments in 1977, the first group
includes Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia; the second group
includes Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela. This distinction is
not steadfast, as the trade position of any country may change either as
a result of that country's change in its trade and economic policies or
as a result of developments in the world price of oil. Indeed, it is
interesting to analyze the circumstances in which a given oil exporter
2For studies on oil supply determination taking into account the
oil production process in detail, see Adelman and Jacoby (1977), Adelman
and Paddock (1979) and Eckbo, Jacoby and Smith (1978).
3The excess capacity of OPEC in March 1979 was estimated to be
4,350 thousand barrels per day, excluding Iran and 8,990 thousand barrels
per day including Iran. Other countries with large excess capacity
were: Saudi Arabia (1,066), Kuwait (1,053), UAE (677), and Iraq (700).
For more discussion of OPEC's excess capacity, see Jacoby and Paddock
(1979).
5would change from one group to the other. For instance, a deficit
country may move to the surplus group by restricting its imports and/or
expanding its exports of oil and other commodities, and vice versa.
This distinction is significant when judging the relative influence
of these two groups of countries in determining the price of oil. It is
assumed that the surplus countries -- of which Saudi Arabia is the most
important -- play a dominant role in setting the price of oil. 4
Accordingly, the deficit countries are treated as price takers in the
sense that each country takes the world price as given and plans its oil
supply in accordance ith its own national interests, without considering
the implications of that level of oil supply on the world price of oil.
This treatment has the desirable analytical advantage of simplifying our
financial analysis.
The paper is divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses the
influence of financial factors on the oil production decisions of one
deficit country, Venezuela. The discussion uses a macro-financial model
constructed to capture the important characteristics of Venezuela's
economy. This model analyzes how changes in oil revenues affect such
important economic variables as the rate of economic growth, money
supply, governmental deficit or surplus, balance of payments, and the
amount of foreign borrowing or lending. This analysis then derives the
amount of oil supplied, given the government's overall economic
objectives with regard to growth and external financial position. The
model is designed to be particularly suitable for simulation purposes.
4In most of the studies about OPEC, this has enerally been
accepted as a working assumption; see for example, delman and Jacoby
(1977).
6It allows one to analyze the implications of alternative financing
options, such as foreign borrowing, on the oil supply decisions of the
oil exporters. Given the option of foreign borrowing, the oil supply
decisions of these countries will be directly affected by how they
exercise this option. To the extent that these countries may resort to
foreign borrowing instead of seeking higher oil revenues from increased
oil production, their oil supply decisions will be shaped to a large
extent by both the availability and cost of foreign borrowing and the
expected price of oil. If oil under the ground is expected to appreciate
by more than the compensation for the cost of foreign borrowing, then it
may be more profitable to hold back production and borrow abroad. For
this reason the option of foreign borrowing has been explicitly
incorporated in the model.
Section 2 analyzes how financial considerations influences oil
supply decisions of one surplus country, Saudi Arabia. Hypotheses about
the likely behavior of this country in utilizing its foreign financial
assets, as an alternative to the export of oil in financing its imports,
are developed, and on the basis of these hypotheses, the oil supply
schedules for this country, until 1985, are derived. These calculations
are performed using different scenarios of the real price of oil and
different levels of imports.
Section 3 presents some important conclusions.
Is
72. DEFICIT COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF VENEZUELA
This section has two objectives: (a) to analyze the effect of
changes in oil xports on the domestic economy of Venezuela; and (b) to
derive some likely oil export requirements for this country, given the
world oil price and the government's overall economic objectives with
regard to growth and monetary stability. These objectives are pursued,
in turn, in subsections 2.1 and 2.2.
2.1 The Impact of Changes in Oil Revenues on the Domestic Economy
In analyzing the effect of hanges in oil revenues on the economy of
Venezuela, we have used a macro-financial model constructed for this
country. The model is essentially a Kenysian type macro-model which has
been modified to capture some of the important characteristics of an oil
exporting country. An important distinguishing characteristic of these
countrys' economies is the fact that a substantial portion of their
export earnings, namely oil revenues, accrue directly to the government.
Thus, changes in oil revenues have monetary implications for both the
government's budget and the balance of payments. In other words, the
government's budget and the balance of payments in these countries are
highly interdependent.5 For instance, any improvement in the balance
of payments, brought about as a result of increased oil revenues, is
simultaneously accompanied by an improvement in the government's budget.
5For a detailed discussion of this distinguishing feature of oil
exporters, and its implications for domestic money an credit creation,
see Dailami (1978), and Morgan (1979).
8The macro-financial model used in this study is designed to
explicitly capture the interaction in the government and external
sectors, as well as make provisions for analyzing the influence of
alternative financing options (such as foreign and domestic borrowing) on
the oil supply decision of the government. A presentation of the model
with the estimation results for Venezuela is presented in Appendix A. A
more detailed description and discussion of this model will be available
in a forthcoming working paper.
This section is confined to the discussion of some of the simulation
results of the model. Given an anticipated oi revenue trajectory, the
model computes the resulting GDP, money supply, government deficit and
government foreign debt, as well as other macroeconomic variables, over
the study period. Table (1) presents the simulation results for these
variables through 1985, on the basis of two oil revenue increase
scenarios: 12.5 and 17.5 percent annual increases.6 All results
presented in Table 1 are in nominal terms. With the amount of oil
revenue increasing at 12.5 percent per year, GDP increases from an actual
value of 156.1 billion bolivares in 1977 to a simulated value of 361.5
billion bolivares in 1985. Over the 1978-1985 simulation period, GDP
increases at a steady rate of about 10 percent per year in nominal terms,
which is less than the rate of growth observed during the 1976-1977
period. The government budget will be mostly in deficit during the
6Any increase in the amount of oil revenues can be interpreted
either as a result of changes in oil exports or as a result of changes in
oil prices. For this part of our simulation, the source of change does
not matter. But to be consistent with the arguments in the rest of the
paper we interpret the changes in oil revenues as a result of changes in
the price of oil.
9simulation period, but not at a scale that would create financing
problems. The projected government deficit increases from a value of
3.19 bolivares in 1978 to 3.79 in 1981, and then declines gradually to
2.47 billion bolivares in 1985. The foreign dbt of the public sector
increases at an annual rate that is more or less sufficient to finance
the government deficit. From an actual value of 17.55 billion bolivares
in 1977, the government's stock of foreign debt increases to 40.19
billion bolivares in 1985. This increase reflects the debt service
payments as well as the net foreign borrowing.
In the case where oil revenues increase by 17.5 percent per year,
the result is a higher rate of economic growth, a higher increase in the
money supply and a higher accumulation of foreign debt. In this case,
GDP will increase at a steady rate of about 13 percent per year
(nominal), over the simulation period. According to this higher oil
revenue increase scenario, the government will, in fact, be compelled to
borrow more heavily abroad. In this case, its stock of foreign debt will
reach a level of 46.55 billion bolivares in 1985. As compared to the
corresponding figure in the previous case, this indicates an increase of
about 6.36 billion bolivares in the stock of foreign debt in 1985.
2.2 The Projected Oil Export Requirements
Given the dominant role of oil revenues in the government's
budgetary accounts and in the balance of payments, and hence in the pace
of economic growth, the question arises as to how export policies should
be designed to insure economic growth and financial and monetary
stability. In particular, if a certain rate of economic growth is
targeted, and if oil export policies are geared to achieving this
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objective, then what is the required level of oil exports? In answering
this question for Venezuela, the macro-financial model is used in this
section to generate simulated oil export requirements assuming different
target rates of economic growth and different oil price increase
scenarios. Specifically, three alternative economic growth scenarios of
varying degrees of robustness are attempted: 10%, 15%, and 20% annual
growth in nominal GDP.7 These simulations are each run under three
nominal oil price increase scenarios: 12.5%, 14.5%, and 17.5%8 annual
growth rates through 1985.
Table (2) presents our model's projections of Venezuela's average
daily oil export requirements to 1985, on the basis of the above oil
price and economic growth scenarios. As this Table indicates, the
simulated oil export requirements are highly dependent on the assumptions
made with regard to the future behavior of the price of oil and the rate
of economic growth. This is particularly true for the later years of the
sample period. For instance, in 1985, with the price of oil increasing
at an annual rate of 17.5 percent until then, the simulated oil export
requirements vary from 1.26 to 3.27 million barrels per day, depending on
7Ideally, the real rate of growth of GDP should be used in this
simulation exercise. But since the model, at its present stage, does not
explain inflationary pressure in the economy, we were forced to use
nominal GDP growth rate. This presents the problem of not knowing
whether a certain growth rate in GDP is due to inflation or due to actual
growth in the economy. Research is under way to improve the model in
this direction.
8The reason for choosing these particular values for oil price
increases is explored in detail in Section 3. Basically, these oil price
increase scenarios are considered from the viewpoint of Saudi Arabia.
Specifically, these figures are calculated to insure Saudi Arabia's terms
of trade to stay constant, to grow at 2 or 5 percent per year through
1985, if Saudi Arabia's import price index increases at its historical
rate of 12.5 percent per year (the 1972-1978 average).
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whether the economy grows at 10 percent or 20 percent per year from 1978
to 1985. Similarly, changes in the anticipated price of oil influence
the supply of oil, but not so much as changes in the rate of economic
growth affect oil supply. For instance, in 985, with GDP growing at 15
percent per year, the simulated oil export requirements vary from 2.94 to
2.07 million barrels per day, depending on whether price grows at 12.5
percent or 17.5 percent per year from 1978 to 1985. In other words, the
simulated oil export requirements exhibit more sensitivity to changes in
the rate of economic growth than to price changes. Thus, in the next few
years, the oil export policy of Venezuela seems to be more strongly
influenced by internal economic needs for financial resources than by
movements in the price of oil.
As may also be observed from Table 2, the oil export requirements of
Venezuela in the mid-1980s, as implied by the outcome of most of the
secnarios considered here, will exceed its present oil production
capacity. Maintaining the existing oil production capacity of 2.2 to 2.4
million barrels a day,9 and a projected internal oil consumption of
about 550 thousand barrels per day in 1985,10 it is only possible for
92.4 refers to maximum sustainable capacity of Venezuela; that is, it is
the maximum, production rate that can be sustained for several months; and 2.2
refers to available or allowable capacity. It reflects production ceilings
usually applied to annual average output. See, Euromoney, July 1979, for this.
10This figure represents a very rough approximation to Venezuela's
consumption of refined petroleum products. It is estimated using the
assumption that Venezuela's consumption of refined petroleum products will
increase through 1985 at its historical annual rate of 8.46 percent - average
over 1972-1977 period - (source of data: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin
1977). The consumption of refined petroleum products has historically been
Tless than total domestic oil used (the difference between oil production and
oil exports) due to use of oil in the oil fields and in the refineries, and
this discrepancy in some years has been very significant, see Aljanabi (1979)
for this. Thus, the total amount of oil used in 1985 is likely to exceed the
projected value of 550 thousand barrels a day.
14
Venezuela to accomodate a growth rate of up to 10 percent per year in
nominal GDP through 1985, so long as the growth rate of the price of oil
lies within the range of 12.5 to 17.5 percent per year. However, any
policy that may envisage a growth rate greater than 10 percent per year
(for that oil price range) will likely be constrained by oil production
capacity and, thus, its implementation will require expansion of the
existing oil production capacity. The urgency for expansion of the oil
capacity will, in fact, be greater if the annual rate of growth in the
price of oil falls below 12.5 percent during the 1978-1985 period.
However, for the immediate future (from one to two years), there does not
appear to be any pressing need for expansion of the existing oil
production capacity, even if the economy is expected to grow beyond 10
percent per year.
Concentrating on the immediate future, say 1980 or 1981, it is
possible to derive some likely oil export forecasts for Venezuela. In
achieving this objective it is important to take into account the recent
price increases administered by OPEC in late 1978 and in 1979. Inview of
these recent oil price adjustments, the actual price of oil in 1980 or
1981 is likely to be close to the outcome of our high-oil-increase
scenario; that is, oil price increases of 17.5 percent per year. Thus,
according to this scenario, the oil exports of Venezuela will be between
1.56 to 1.91 million barrels a day in 1980 and between 1.49 to 1.93
million barrels in 1981 if the economy grows at a rate of between 10 to
15 percent per year in the interim period.
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3. SURPLUS COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA
3.1 Oil Production Requirements
This section focuses on the financial surplus oil-producing
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. The vital role that Saudi Arabia
could play in balancing the net world demand for petroleum and in
maintaining and securing stability in the price of oil is well
recognized.11 The combination of several factors has given this
country the ability to exercise a dominant influence on the pace of
OPEC's oil supply, and thereby on the price of oil. These factors
include Saude Arabia's large oil reserves, its relatively small
population, its existing large productive capacity and oil exports, and
its substantial financial assets. Saudi Arabia has the world's largest
oil reserves and currently is the largest oil exporter. According to
experts' estimates, its production profile could easily stretch to 2025
and years beyond. Based on "possible" reserves of 225 to 245 billion
barrels, this country can maintain a production level of up to 8 mmbd in
2025, with an interim sustainable production plateau of 12 million
barrels per day for 36 years.12 In terms of financial assets, Saudi
Arabia has the largest accumulation of foreign assets among OPEC
countries. During the period 1974-1978, its cumulative current account,
11For analysis of Saudi Arabia's role as the residual oil supplier
see General Accounting Office, report to the U.S. Congress (1978), The
United States Senate, a staff reprot to the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy (1979), Noreng (1978), and Jacoby and Paddock (1979).
12This is on the basis of a staff report to a subcommittee to the
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1979.
16
on the balance of payments, amounted to $83 billion. This raised the
Saudi Arabians' net external assets to $73 billion at the end of 1978.13
Given these financial and mineral resources, Saudi Arabia clearly
has a great deal of flexibility in monitoring its oil production policies
to pursue other objectives in addition to internal revenue needs. From
the viewpoint of foreign exchange requirements, it seems possible for
Saudi Arabia to accomodate moderate increases in its level of imports in
the immediate future, and at the same time, to cut its production to much
lower levels. Table (3) presents some rough calculations of the future
average daily oil production necessary for Saudi Arabia to balance its
yearly current account through 1985.14 These calculations are
performed using different scenarios of the real price of oil and
different levels of imports. Also incorporated in these calculations is
the assumption that Saudi Arabia will not draw on its foreign financial
assets. However, interest receipts on foreign assets - net of grants and
aid to other countries - will continue to be an additonal source of
income.
Considering the oil production "requirements" of Saudi Arabia in the
next few years, it is interesting to observe that our simulation model
implies levels of oil production that fall balow the current oil
production. For instance, the "required" daily oil production for 1980
appears to be 5.63, 5.32, and 4.90 million barrels if the real price of
13See Morgan Guaranty Trust, World financial Markets, May 1979.
14These calculations are perfomred using a simple model constructed
for Saudi Arabia. For discussion of the model and the assumptions made
in generating the simulation results, see Appendix B.
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oil15 stays constant, grows at 2 percent per year, and grows at 5
percent per year, respectively, and if import volume increases at 25
percent per annum. Increasing the annual growth rate of import volume to
30 percent, the rquired oil production levels corresponding to the three
oil price scenarios above rise to 6.37, 6.1, and 5.62 million barrels per
day. This conclusion seems to hold until 1982, when simulated oil
production requirements begin to exceed the current level with
accelerating speed.
Also interesting is the observation that the simulated oil
production requirements are highly dependent on the assumptions made with
regard to the growth of imports and with the future behavior of the real
price of oil. This dependency is especially more pronounced for the
later years of the sample period. For instance, in 1985, with the real
price of oil staying constant, the simulation result imply a required
daily oil production of 18.52 million barrels per day if import volume
grows at 25 percent per year, and a production level of 25.14 million
barrels per day if imports grow at 30 percent per year. These figures,
however, are considerably reduced to 12.81 and 17.29 if it is assumed
15The real price of oil, Pr, is defined as Pr = Po/Pm, where Po is
the nominal price of oil in terms of U.S. dollar and Pm is Saudi Arabia's
import price index. Saudi Arabia's import price index was estimated over
the period 1972-1978 as the weighted average of the export price indicies
of nine major industrial countries (the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Germany,
France, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands), all expressed
in dollar terms. The weights used were Saudi Arabia's import shares from
these countries. See Dailami (1979a) and (1979b) for a detailed
discussion of this. This procedure resulted in an annual rate of growth
of about 12.5 percent per year for Saudi Arabia's import price index (the
1972-1978 average). Assuming that this trend continues in the future,
the nominal price of oil should increase at 12.5 percent per year to
insure the real price of oil, viewed from Saudi Arabia's viewpoint, to
stay constant.
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that the real price of oil increases by 5 percent per year. But, even
with this high-oil-price-increase scenario, the projected oil production
requirements for 1985 appear to be improbably high and they exceed the
present oil production capacity of Saudi Araiia.16 Then to what extent
Saudi Arabia may expand its oil production capacity to accomodate these
projected oil production requiremewnts depends to a large extent on its
emphasis on continuing a policy of import-intensive economic growth, and
to some extent, on the future price of oil. Judging from the recent
experience of Saudi Arabia, an assumed rate of growth of 30 percent per
year in the volume of imports is in fact an underestimation of the actual
rate. During the period 1974-1978 Saudi Arabia's imports increased 40
percent per year in real terms.17 This made saudi Arabia the largest
OPEC importer in 1978. To what extent this high rate of import growth
will be sustained in the future is conjecture. Much depends on the ease
with which saudi Arabia can curtail its imports, by either promoting
domestic production or slowing economic growth. However, in the short
run - say two to three years - the scope of implementing an effective
import-substitution policy seems limited. This leaves slowing economic
growth as the only viable option.
According to the 5 percent real-oil-price-increase scenario and
starting with the base price of $13.33 per barrel in 1977,18 the
16See note 3.
17See Morgan Guaranty, World Financial Markets, May 1979, p. 2.
18This is the average price of Arabian Light, F.O.B. Ras Tanura,
34.00 - 34.09, in 1977. The average is taken over two observations: $13
in January 1, and $13.66 in July 1, 1977. Source of data: OPEC Annual
Statistical Bulletin, 1977, p. 130.
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nominal price of oil will be about $50.50 per barrel in 1985. This
figure reflects an assumed rate of increase of 12.5 percent per year in
the price ofoil to compensate for the effects of inflation and exchange
rate changes in addition to the 5 percent increase in the real price.
Implicit in this calculation is the assumption that saudi Arabia's import
price index will increase at its historical rate of 12.5 percent (the
1972-1978 average), through 1985. Also implicit in this calculation is
the assumption that OPEC can protect its export earnings by keeping
constant the real price of oil. From OPEC's point of view, this will
essentially involve adopting an oil pricing mechanism that would reduce
or eliminate the risk of exchange rate changes as well as gradually
adjusting the nominal price of oil in proportion to the rate of inflation
in the industrial countries.19 In the past, specifically the period
1974-1978, the real price of oil exhibited a trend of continuous
decline. However, this trend has probably been reversed by the series of
oil price increases administered in late 1978 and in 1979. This has
resulted in a price of oil in 1979 for Saudi Arabia that is very close to
the outcome of our 5 percent real-oil-price increase scenario. However,
it remains to be seen how accurately this scenario will predict the
actual price of oil for years beyond 1979.
19For a detailed study of how OPEC can rotect its export earnings
from exchange rate losses, see Dailami (1978b).
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3.2 The Option of Building Up Foreign Assets
An additional option open to Saudi Arabia is to continue its oil
procution at the current level for the next few years in order to build
up its foreign assets, which can be drawn on in later years. The
interest earned on these assets can provide an additional source of
income to lessen the pressure on the oil sector. However, the extent to
which interest earnings can substitute oil exports as a source of
financing imports in any specific year depends on the level of imports in
that year, on the quantity of oil exported in the preceding years, and on
the behavior of the real price of oil. table (4) presents the outcome of
a simulation exercise undertaken to show the effectiveness of this policy
option. This exercise uses several different assumptions regarding the
growth of imports and the future price of oil. For instance, with import
volume growing at 25 percent per year, and with a constant real price of
oil, the proportion of imports that can be financed by interest earnings
in 1980 is about 32 percent if saudi Arabia's oil export is maintained at
9 million barrels per day in 1979. Changing the rate of growth of import
volume to 30 percent per year, the corresponding figure declined to 28
percent. In any case, these results indicate that Saudi Arabia can cut
its oil exports by an amount equivalent to one-third of its imports in
1980, by merely relying on its interest earnings in that year.
However, the proportion of total imports that can be financed by
interest declines sharply towards the middle of the 1980's. Even under
the most optimistic scenario considered here - rate of growth of import
volume of 25 percent per year and a 5 percent increasein the real price
of oil - only about 12 percent of total imports can be financed in 1985
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by relying on interest earnings in that year if oil exports are
maintained at 9 million barrels per day through 1984. In the event that
import volume increases 30 percent per year and the real price of oil
stays constant through 1985, the proportion of imports that can be
financed by interest earnings in 1985 declines sharply to less than one
percent. This decline clearly reflects that an oil export policy of 9
million barrels per day is insufficient to finance Saudi Arabia's imports
in the mid-1980s. Consequently, Saudi Arabia will be increasingly
compelled to draw on its stock of foreign financial assets to finance its
imports. The need to draw on foreign assets will be greater if import
volume grows at rates exceeding 25 percent per year and if the real price
of oil does not increase during the 1978-1985 period.
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TABLE 4
THE PROPORTION OF IMPORTS FINANCED BY INTEREST INCOME
(1978-1985)
CONSTANT REAL
PRICE OF OIL
.33
.33
.32
.28
.23
.18
.12
.06
.32
.31
.28
.23
.17
.11
.15
.007
2 PERCENT INCREASE
IN REAL PRICE OF OIL
.33
.34
.33
.29
.25
.20
.14
.09
.32
.31
.28
.24
.18
.13
.07
.02
5 PERCENT INCREASE
IN REAL PRICE OF OIL
.33
.34
.34
.31
.27
.23
.18
.12
.32
.31
.29
.25
.20
.15
.10
.05
(a) Import volume grows at 25 percent/year
(b) Import volume grows at 30 percent/year
YEAR
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Notes:
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4. CONCLUSION
This paper discussed haw short-term financial considerations may
influence the oil production policies of oil exporting countries, and
concentrated on two countries: Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. In the case
of Venezuela, a macro-financial model was constructed to analyze the
effect of changes in oil revenues on GDP, money supply, government
deficit, and government foreign debt. In this regard it was found that
increases in the oil revenues will have a positive effect on all these
variables. For instance, an incremental increase of 5 percent in oil
revenues from 12.5 to 17.5 percent per year will raise the average annual
rate of growth of GDP from 10 percent to 13 percent during the simulation
period, i.e., 1978-1985. The model was then used to forecast likely oil
exports of Venezuela. Different oil price and economic growth scenarios
were used in forecasting oil exports. In view of the recent OPEC oil
price adjustments, we decided to rely on the outcome of the
high-oil-price-increase scenario as the most accurate prediction of the
actual price of oil in 1980 and 1981. In this case, the oil exports of
Venezuela were forecast to be between 1.56 and 1.91 million barrels per
day in 1980, and between 1.49 and 1.93 million barrels per day in 1981,
if the economy were to grow at a rate between 10 and 15 percent per year
during the interim period.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, our analysis was conducted with a more
simplified model. By concentrating on the external sector of Saudi
Arabia's economy, the average daily oil production requirements for this
country were derived using different scenarios of the real-price of oil
and different levels of imports. It was generally found that Saudi
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Arabia could cut its oil production, in 1980, by about 1/3 of its current
production and still plan for import volume growth of up to 30 percent
per year in 1979. However, it will not be feasible to continue this
policy of import growth to the mid-1980's, even at a steady oil
production level of 9 million barrels per day. In fact, in 1985 Saudi
Arabia's oil production requirements for import growth rates of even 25
percent per year in real terms would most likely be constrained by
productive capacity limitations.
Thus, in the early years of the 1980's, Saudi Arabia will probably be
compelled, due to both financial and productive capacity limitations, to
cut its import growth rate to below 25 percent per year in real terms.
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Appendix A
A.l1. The Model
Government Sector
1. Log(GPUR) = g + g Log(XP)
2. Log(GREVNET)= n + n1 . Log(GDP) + n2 Log(GREVNET(-l))
3. Log(GREVP) = f + f . Log(XP)
4. D = GPUR + GEXPINT + GEXPAM - GREVNET - GREVP
5. GEXPINT = r . B(-1)
6. B = B(-1) + (l-X) . D + l- ) . DIR
7. BF= . B
8. GEXPAM = (. B -1)
Foreign and Monetary Sector
9. Log(IMP) = m + m . Log(GDP)
10. DIR = XNP + XP - IMP + B -(1+ r) . B-1) + PKF
11. MOR = MOR(-1i) + X.D + .DIR + A BC
Private Sector
12. Log(A) = a + a1. Log(GDP) +a 2 Log(MOR)02
13. GDP = A + XNP + XP + GPUR - IMP
Oil Sector
14. PRODOIL = XP/(POIL . XRATE . 365)
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Notation
a. Policy Variables (Parameters)
A The proportion of total government deficit financed by the
central bank. ' .. .
The proportion of increases in international reserves which
bocomes part of the monetary base.
. ................... 
.. ...... _.__
The proportion of the government debt held by foreigners.
_ . .
.. 
.
..
V The proportion of government debt amortized each year.
XRATE Exchange Rate Boivares/U.S.$
b. Exogenous Variables
GDP Gross Domestic Product at current market prices.
POlL Price of oil U.S.$/barrel
XNP Exports of non-petroleum products
PKF Private Foreign Capital Inflow (net)
BC Central banks net credit to commercial banks.
c. Endogenous Variables
GPUR Government expenditures on goods and services
GREVNET Non petroleum government revenues, net of transfers (excluding
interest) made to the private sector.
GREVP Government revenues from petroleum.
GEXPINT Government interest payments on its debt
D Government deficit
B Total government- debt
BF Government foreign debt.
GEXPAM Government expenditure on amortization of its debt
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IMP Inports of goods and services
XP Exports of oil and gas
DIR Change in international reserves
A Total private expenditure
PRODOIL Production of oil--millions of barrels per day
MOR Monetary base
--- -- ------ --I ----------
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A.2 Estimation Results
We estimated equations (1), (2), (3), (9) and (12) using O.L.S.
over the period 1962-1977. The results were as follows:
Equation (1)
parameter value
-2.00
1.20
R2 = .954
t-statistic
3.09
17.77
D.W. = 1.25
Equation (2)
parameter
n
o
n 1
n2
R2 = .957
value
-1.85
0.54
0.53
t-statistic
2.74
3.02
2.80
D.W. = 2.25
Equation (3)
parameter value
-3.59f0
f1
2 = .991
1.32
t-statistic
11.20
39.56
D.W. = 1.65
Equation (9)
parameter value
-4.32
m1
R = .942
1.25
t-statistic
4.91
15.60
D.W. = 1.18
Equation (12)
parameter
a
o
a1
a 2
2 = .965
= .965
value
3.08
0.33
0.46
t-statistic
2.67
1.28
2.25
D.W. = 1.00
In the simulation exercises the following values were chosen
for the policy variables: 
X = .29, Y = 5, 8 = .7, = .1, XRATE = 4.29
A.3 Data
The data were compiled mainly from two sources: International onetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues, and Banco Central
de Venezuela, Informe Economico, various issues, Caracas Venezuela.
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APPENDIX B
A SIMPLE MODEL OF OIL EXPORT AND
FOREIGN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION FOR
SAUDI ARABIA
B.1 The Model
At_- At1 + St
St =Xt + r.At_1 - Gt - Vmt
C l + g)
Poilt = Poilt_1 (1 + gpo)
Pmt = Pt-l ( + g m)
Vmt = Qmt.Pmt
Qt = CXt 1000)/(Poilt . 365) + Dct
Dct =Dt_ 1 (lgdc)
B.2 Notation
At Net external assets at the end of year t in billions of U.S. dollars
St Current account surplus in billions of U.S. dollars
Xt Oil revenue in billions of U.S. dollars
Qmt Quantity of Imports
Pmt Price of imports in terms of U.S. dollars
Poilt Price of oil (US $ per barrel)
Rt Daily oil production (million barrels)
tDct Domestic Consumption (million barrels)
Annual rate of growth in quantity of imports
D O Annual rate of growth in price of oil
gm Annual rate of growth in price of Saudi's imports
32
gdc Annual rate of growth in Saudi Arabia's domestic oil consumption
Vmt Value of imports of goods and services, in billions of U.S. dollars.
r Foreign rate of interest, 12-month Eurodollar deposit rate
Gt Grants and aids to other countries
B.3 Memorandum
A1977 = $68 billion, source: World Financial Markets, November 1977.1977
r = 10 percent per year; this is very close to the 12-month Eurodollar
deposit rate in June 1979.
Vm977 = $14.66 billion, converted to U.S. dollars by dividing the
value of imports in riyals in 1977 by the exchange rate
(3,52 riyals/U.S. $).
Source: International Monetary Fund, IFS, May 1979.
Dc1977 = 166.2 (1000 B/D), estimate, source: OPEC Review, March 1979
G $3 billion throughout the simulation period: this is the average of Saudi
Arabia grants and aid to other countries over 1974-1978, source: World
Financial Markets, May 1979.
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